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Abstract Business activity and consumption activities are recognised as 
impacting,  often  negatively,  on  the  environment.  The  challenge  of 
‘satisfying the needs of the present generation without compromising 
the chance for future generations to satisfy theirs’ requires, however, 
contributions by all societal actors. A growing number of firms “over-
comply”  with  environmental  regulation  for  several  reasons.  Firms 
satisfy consumer demand and try to shape that demand. In doing so, 
they may create a taste for environment protection and sustainability. 
Corporate social responsibility has received considerable attention. The 
concept of ‘consumer social responsibility’ has received comparatively 
little  attention  probably  because  of  the  dominance  of  the  notion  of 
consumer  sovereignty.  If  consumers’  perception  of  corporate  social 
responsibility  practices  drives  their  purchase  behaviour,  firms  are 
motivated  to invest in  socially  responsible practices.  However, there 
exists a wide gap between positive attitudes toward social responsibility 
and actual purchase behaviours. This paper tries to shed some light on 
what  affects  individuals’  perceptions  about  their  responsibilities  as 
citizens/consumers and their consumption behaviour.  
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Consumers  and  firms,  in  carring  out  their  normal  activities,  generate  environmental 
externalities, usually negative externalities. The market is by definition incapable of dealing 
by itself with externalities, unless they are converted into internalities through consumers’ or 
investors’ tastes (Crouch, 2006). State regulation is binding and can play an important role in 
bringing about environment friendly behaviours by firms and consumers. It is not perfect, 
however, and it may even end up reducing social welfare because of its cost or inefficiency. 
States  may  also  lack  the  resources  and  competence  to  formulate  and  enforce appropriate 
regulations.  
Neither profit maximising firms nor utility maximising consumers have incentives to 
invest, produce and consume in an environment-friendly way. If consumers and firms behave 
in an environment-friendly way, in fact, they have no guarantee that others will do the same. 
They face the tangible costs of their environmentally responsible behaviour in the current 
period but the benefits are spread over time (perhaps over many generations) and across many 
individuals. Rational, self-interested economic agents, have no private incentive to contribute 
to the environment as a public good.  
However, one of the pressing concerns for business organisations is the survival of the 
business  itself.  In  a  world  in  which  externalities  coexist  with  other  departures  from  the 
competitive paradigm, firms may find it in their interest to protect environment to a greater 
degree than that required by law. The simultaneous existence of different kinds of market 
failure  can  reinforce  the  tendencies  of  economic  agents  to  over-consume  under-priced 
environmental  resources,  but  it  can  also  counteract  those  tendencies.  Whether  -  from  the 
shareholders’  perspective  -  it  makes  sense  for  a  firm  to  adopt  an  environment  friendly 
behaviour beyond legal requirements should depend, among other things, on the structure of 
the  firm’s  industry,  on  its  competitive  position  within  that  structure,  and  on  its  internal 
organizational capabilities (Reinhart, 1999).  
It is good that each person is free to get what he/she wants, in so far as this is possible 
within the constraints imposed by other people' s being free to get what they want. This is the 
intuition that underlies the well-known concept of consumer sovereignty
1. Each individual, it 
is  usually  claimed,  is  the  best  or  proper  judge  of  his/her  own  well-being,  and  those 
judgements of well-being are revealed in his/her preferences (Sugden, 2004).  
The  traditional  consumer  sovereignty  model  conceptualizes  the  consumer  as  an 
autonomous, rational agent who is able to behave in a way that  allows to realize positive 
societal  outcomes  (Dixon  1992).  Market  choices  represent  consumer  ‘votes’  for  socially 
desirable outcomes, such that consumers can signal to firms the types of products they want 
(Shaw et al. 2006). 
The assumption that consumer’s satisfaction can be identified with happiness and that, 
therefore,  optimizing  consumer’s  satisfaction  is  to  optimize  happiness,  however,  is  not 
realistic neither at the level of individuals nor at the level of societies as cigarette smokers, for 
example, may confirm.  
Within  a  market  economy,  business  behaviour  is  not  independent  from  consumer’s 
behavior  and  consumer’s  acceptance.  Rather than  criticizing  business  alone  (as consumer 
activists tend to) or passing on the responsibility to the market and to the consumers (as 
businesses tend to) it seems more progressing to consider environmental sustainability as a 
shared responsibility of business and consumers (Brinkmann, 2004). 
                                                
1 While consumer sovereignty is normally formulated in terms of the satisfaction of coherent preferences, we 
have to recognize that individual’s preferences over given outcomes vary according to viewpoints from which 
decision problems are assessed or according to the contextual framing of those problems (Thaler, 1980; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991).  
￿
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Citizens  in  many  industrialized  societies  are  well  informed  about  their  own  role  in 
engendering problems. They choose to behave in ways that contribute to the problems or to 
their  solutions.  Hence,  as  individuals  they  are  morally  responsible  for  environmental 
problems (Fahlquist, 2008). Given that responsibility is traditionally an idea belonging more 
to citizenship it has helped doing up to consumption the idea of citizenship (Dickinson and 
Carsky 2005).  A  consumer  citizen acts  beyond her/his interests  as a  consumer and takes 
responsibility for long-term considerations beyond herself/himself (Varney, 2002). The focus 
of  consumers  responsibility  is  on  citizens  who  are  concerned  with  the  effects  that  a 
purchasing choice has, not only on themselves, but also on the outside world around them. 
Just  as  corporations  have  been  encouraged  to  adopt  practices  of  corporate  social 
responsibility (CSR), so consumers too have been charged with a responsibility to use their 
‘purchase votes’ to achieve positive social outcomes (Dickinson and Carsky 2005). 
Consumers  ‘have’  certain  levels  of  responsibility  which  they  in  turn  express  as 
preferences for socially beneficial product features or broader CSR characteristics, thereby 
pulling new products and services through the ‘market for virtue’ (Vogel 2005) and driving 
new socially responsible patterns of production and consumption.  
Firms play an important role in the construction of responsible consumers’ behaviour 
and markets. Since, as is well known, firms satisfy consumer demand and try to shape that 
demand, they may create a taste for environment protection and sustainability (Crouch, 2006). 
Environmental  concerns  and  awareness  have  increased  since  the early  1970,  but  an 
attitude-behaviour gap still exists: environmentally concerned consumers do not seem to show 
consistent preferences for environment friendly products in their purchase behaviour. This 
paper  tries  to  shed  some  light  on  what  affects  individual  perceptions  about  their 
environmental responsibilities as citizens/consumers and their consumption behaviour. This is 
a relevant issue given that consumers’ responsibility affects environment and social welfare 
for present and future generations. 
It is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relations between the main actors who 
play a relevant role in the engendering and/or in the solution of environmental issues. Section 
3 briefly presents the concept of consumer social responsibility and section 4 presents the 
drivers  of  this  responsibility.  The  consumer  responsibility  as  a  complement  of  corporate 
social responsibility initiatives is analysed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Actors playing relevant roles 
 
Three main groups of actors, state/government, citizens/consumers and firms,  play essential 
roles in environmental issues and affect the opportunities of future generations. These actors 
are interrelated through a range of regulations, actions and transactions.  
In  order  to  analyze  how  the  relations  between  these  three  groups  of  actors  affect 
environment,  we  place  different  firms,  different  individuals,  and  institutions  under  the 
unifying label of ‘actor’. What we label as actor, however, are often an aggregation of entities, 
which do not express a single opinion in the environmental issues. Firms, for example, deal 
with workers, suppliers, investors, local, national and trans-national institutions in addition to 
their customers. Yet firms are the only actors that consumers are consciously dealing with. 
‘Citizens/consumers’ form the most heterogeneous group with differing awareness of their 
environmental impact as well as a range of views on policies. 
 Fig. 1 draws the relations among the main actors  having an impact on a group of actors 
that, by definition, have no chance to participate in the interactions and defend their interests, 






















Fig.1 The relations among the three main actors playing essential roles in environmental 
issues and influencing future generations’ opportunities. 
 
G1 State/Government: 
￿  Enforces existing legislation; Emanates regulations; Negotiates on international 
treaties; 
￿  Provides public goods; Imposes taxes; 
￿  Mitigates citizens risks. 
G2 State/Government: 
￿  Enforces existing legislation; Emanates regulations; Negotiates on international 
treaties; 
￿  Provides public goods; Imposes taxes; 
￿  Favours voluntary agreements 
G3 State/Government: 
￿  By limiting present generation’s (consumers and firms) choices trough regulation and 
law  enforcement,  tries  to  preserve  environment  in  order  not  to  compromising  the 
possibility of future generations to satisfy their needs.  
 
C1 Citizens/Consumers: 
·  Chooce their representatives; 
·  Benefit from public goods/services; Pay taxes; 
·  Generate (positive and negative) externalities; 
·  Lobby for their interests.  
C2 Citizens/Consumers: 
·  Offer input, demand output, produce (positive and negative) externalities; 
·  Make pressure on firms in order to induce them to be environment friendly in 
their productive processes/products;  
C3 Citizens/Consumers: 
·  Deplete resources; Pollute; Contribute to climate change; 


























F1 Firms:  
o  Produce wealth; Benefit from public goods/services; Pay taxes; Generate 
(negative and positive) externalities; 
o  Promote voluntary agreements (as product differentiation strategies/consumers 
attractors etc.); 
o  Lobby for their interests. 
F2 Firms:  
o  Demand input, offer output;  
o  Produce externalities (product and process innovations; pollution, wastes); 
F3 Firms: 
o  Deplete resources; Contribute to climate change; 
o  Contribute to technical progress. 
 
 
This conceptual paper focuses on environment and analyzes the two-way relationships 
between each group of actors in the upper part of Fig.1. 
The  degree  of  State  involvement  in  managing  environmental  protection  might  be 
considered on a spectrum running from ‘free market’ at one end, to ‘nationalized delivery’ at 
the other end. On the one hand, it is not sure that leaving environmental protection to the free 
market, relying, for example, on practices of corporate social responsibility (CSR) will deliver 
the desired results. On the other hand, nationalizing the delivery of environmental protection 
is likely to fail because states rarely have the quantity and quality of information required to 
persuade firms and consumers to make appropriate decisions (Hepburn, 2010). As we will 
see, environment protection requires a commitment by all actors: firms, consumers and State. 
 
2.1 Government and firms 
 
From Adam Smith economists learned that the basic role of government is to establish the 
rules  of  the  game.  For  what  concerns  its  relations  with  firms,  government  emanates  and 
enforces regulations, negotiate on international treaties; provides public goods, imposes taxes 
and favours voluntary agreements. In order to protect future generations, government limits 
current generation’s choice trough regulation.  
It is true that government can, alternatively, tax firms that pollute excessively. The use 
of  fiscal  powers  can  reduce  or  increase  corporate  profits  directly,  thus  constituting  a 
potentially high powered incentive device. However, it is also true that the government/state 
often fails. 
The government may be interested in reaching improved environmental management in 
a not conflictive manner, at low cost and with a good impact on job creation, while improving 
competitive positions in respect to trade, and ultimately making economic and social gains. 
The government’s approach to environmental issues may be seen as a three-part plan: (i) 
to  inform,  awaken  and  engage  firms  in  dialogue  and  negotiations  concerning  voluntary 
initiatives; (ii) to offer incentives for and assistance to firms seeking to adopt environmentally 
responsible business models; and (iii) to re-enforce monitoring of environmental conditions 
and  enforce  sanctions.  More  precisely  government  can  stimulate  the  private  sector  by 
collecting  and  disseminating  information,  raising  awareness  and  providing  funding  for 
research (Mazurkiewicz and Grenna, 2003). 
Firms - being in direct contact with domestic goods and services users - are, in fact, 
considered decisive agents for emissions reduction from the domestic sector. However, there 
are usually inherent problems of incentives and asymmetry of information between agents 
(firms) and principal (government). The main conflict is between firms’ business objectives to  
￿
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be profitable and to increase market shares, and the government requirement for them to bring 
about greater respect for environment in order to preserve it to future generations.  
Firms and government do not share common goals and information. It may happen that 
the rules of the game are not well associated with the goals or, alternatively, that there are 
multiple games with confusing sets of rules. Nonetheless, government issues policies that 
firms must implement: in this respect, there is an element of command and control in these 
relations. 
Given that the government’s policy path which attempts to make the firm the main agent 
for the  reduction of  the  consumers’ demand  of environment  unfriendly goods,  undergoes 
intrinsic principal-agent problems, it might be not the best policy path. This raises broader 
questions about firms’ ability to be agents of social change and businesses at the same time. 
To meet government requirements good businesses interactions with consumers would 
become vital.  
Firms–government relations are not, however, solely based on obligations and direct 
regulation.  There  is  also  a  network  of  interactions  that  contribute  to  structuring  the 
relationship. For example, firms’ customers are voters, they constitute the electorate, and 
firms have precious information about consumption patterns that can be necessary for policy 
design. Government also represents some firms’ interests in international negotiations and 
formally consults firms when  regulations are being drafted. Moreover, there are informal 
channels through which consultation and lobbying take place. 
Businesses  over  comply  to  reduce  the  risk  of  tighter  regulation,  or  to  induce  the 
government to choose a form of regulation which is more favourable for them (Segerson and 
Miceli, 1999; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, 2000). A firm’s sunk investments achieve more 
substantial improvement in environmental quality but limit its subsequent actions, they are 
very  costly  to  re-tool.  Business  leaders  may  strategically  commit  themselves  to  modest 
environmental improvements that limit regulators’ ability to set tough standards. If a regulator 
cares  about  industry  profits  as  well  as  environmental  performance,  he  will  set  a  modest 
standard so as not to detrimentally affect profits too much. 
 
2.2 Government and citizens consumers 
  
Government and consumers do not share common objectives and information. Furthermore, 
although  the  demand  is  created  and  mediated  by  many  actors,  consumer’s  decisions, 
purchases and behaviour are still the elements determining the demand for goods and services 
most directly.  
Government’s policy usually tends to view consumers as rational-economic agents who, 
if  provided  with  the  right  economic  incentives  and  information,  will  behave  in  an 
environmental-friendly way. 
From  government  point  of  view,  therefore,  empowering  citizens,  providing  relevant 
information and setting the right market rules will lead the ‘consumer’ in each citizen to make 
the ‘best’ choices (Lewis, 2007). The government’s paradigm that the market should select 
the means to match the end (Mitchell, 2007) implies that consumers only need to response to 
what the ‘market’ offers.  However, through product policy, choice editing on sustainability 
criteria by government is altering market rules.  
Consumer  responses  to information and prices are, furthermore, more complex than 
standard  economic  analysis  suggests  and  other  motivations  may  drive  people  towards  an 
environmental-friendly behaviour (Stern, 1992). 
Simon (1972) identifies some limitations on rational decision-making and argues that a 
lot  of  behaviour  takes  place  under  conditions  of  bounded  rationality:  strict  rationality  is 
prevented by information and cognitive constraints. Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) identify  
￿
￿ ￿￿
three types of limits on rational behaviour in the environmental context: bounded rationality, 
bounded willpower and bounded self-interest. It seems that just increasing the availability of 
information is not necessarily the simple solution. According to Leiserowitz et al. (2010), 
often, the behaviours that would be most effective (e.g. driving cars less often) are neglected 
in favour of the less challenging behaviours such as switching on lights; knowledge and belief 
might  be  not  enough  and  just  because  people  have  knowledge  about  the  benefits  of 
environmental actions does not mean that they will engage in those actions. 
According  to  Gowdy  (2008),  apparently  non-rational  behaviour  is  central  to  human 
decision-making. Cognition reflects an interaction of rational and emotional decision-making 
processes and a greater focus on a unified theory of decision-making, e.g. as offered by neuro-
economics, can also shed some light on environmental decision-making. 
The  weight  given  to  the  market  in  putting  over  demand  reduction  of  environment 
unfriendly commodities implies that consumers do not need to act but to react to market 
signals. Therefore, more attention should be given to the relation between government and 
consumer with a view to more explicit treatment of the politics of environmental damages 
reduction, rather than treating citizens primarily as consumers who response to price signals. 
At the same time, policies and schemes that empower citizens while transforming the 
business  models  of  products  and  services  supply  might  align  the  interests  of  firms  and 
consumers  to  a  greater  extent.  This  has  to  do  with  improving  the  flows  of  information 
between  parties  putting  an  explicit  obligation  on  consumers  to  limit  their  demand  for 
polluting commodities, or pay for their environmental impact. 
Such a mix might promote a market transformation that is ‘pulled’ by consumers who 
are actively searching for environment friendly innovations, technologies and behaviours.  
 
2.3 Firms and consumers 
 
As we have seen, consumers are supposed to choose to alter their consumption in response to 
price,  or  to  choose  to  reduce  their  usage  of  products  and  services  in  response  to  easily 
accessible, clear information. 
CSR  programs,  in  which  firms  voluntarily  try  to  reduce  environmental  and  social 
negative impacts, are increasingly popular but the notion of CSR means different things to 
different  people
2.  According  to  Crouch  (2006)  CSR  is  essentially  ‘corporate  externality 
recognition’. For a firm to reduce production of a negative externality requires it to take 
action that will cost it something, but for which it will not receive payment.  
How can a profit-maximizing firm be expected to take action of such a kind? What 
actually drives firms to engage in environmental CSR? Firms can adopt a CSR program and 
“over-comply”  with  environmental  regulation  for  several  reasons,  two  of  which  seem 
particularly  strong.  One  is  moving  ahead  of  an  expectable  trend  of  both  legislation  and 
consumer' s  preferences  becoming  stricter.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  risk  management. 
Another is the use environmental reputation to gain market shares from less environmentally 
friendly competitors (Heal, 2005).  
The pure market effects emerge from a company that has done just what it was supposed 
to  do.  Market  forces,  in  fact,  include  win/win  opportunities  to  increase  revenues  with 
environmentally responsible consumers who are willing to pay a higher price as a premium 
for environment friendly products and to cut costs by improving the efficiency of resource 
                                                
2  According  to  Ferell  et  al.  (2002,  p.  73),  for  example,  “Corporate  social  responsibility  refers  to  an 
organization’s obligation to maximize its positive impact on stakeholders ... and to minimize its negative impact. 




use, labour market advantages with employees who have green preferences, opportunities to 
reduce cost of capital from green investors (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Lutz, Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2000).  
Standard  economic  principles  can  tell  us  a  lot  about  how  and  why  environmental 
problems  emerge  and  some  inconsistencies can  be  reconciled  by  recognising  that  market 
failures are endemic whilst retaining the assumptions of rational, self-interested and atomistic 
individual action. Understanding how to promote behavioural change by firms requires an 
understanding of how people respond, sometimes imperfectly, to non-price factors.  
Cerin (2006) reports that firms are usually reluctant to adopt a green technology due to 
its higher-than-average costs. However, small groups of environmentally-minded consumers 
who are willing to pay higher prices for green products can provide a market niche for green 
firms with a small market share, eventually forcing overall adoption of the greener technology 
in an industry. Consumer environmental preferences play an important role in the environment 
protection. 
 
3. Consumer social responsibility 
 
Gabriel and Lang (1995, p. 175) define the ‘citizen consumer’ as ‘a responsible consumer, a 
socially-aware consumer, a consumer who thinks ahead and tempers his or her desires by 
social  awareness,  a  consumer  whose  actions  must  be  morally  defensible  and  who  must 
occasionally be prepared to sacrifice...’. Such a concept of consumer responsibility is still 
underdeveloped.  Infact,  while  CSR  has  received  considerable  attention  academically,  the 
concept of ‘consumer social responsibility’, has received comparatively little attention. This 
may be due to the supremacy of the notion of consumer sovereignty, which assigns power as 
opposed to responsibility to consumers (Brinkmann and Peattie, 2008).  
The concept of consumer social responsibility could be defined as analogous to the four 
dimensions of CSR. Therefore it would be “... a consumer’s obligation to maximize his/her 
positive impact on stakeholders ... and to minimize his/her negative impact. There are four 
kinds of ... responsibility: legal, economic, ethical and philanthropic...” (Brinkmann 2007, p. 
88 ).  
According to Brinkmann and Peattie (2008), this is reasonable since an individual has a 
responsibility to respect the law, and could be viewed as having an economic responsibility 
to contribute to his/her household and to support himself-herself. Businesses are expected to 
behave in a moral way partly because society grants them certain privileges (such as a secure 
legal  framework,  access  to  an  educated  workforce,  use  of  economic  infrastructure)  and 
therefore society can have legitimate expectations about how businesses should behave in 
return. Society grants businesses a license to operate; in the same way it grants individuals a 
license to live as free citizens. This means that individuals have to comply with society’s 
rules and expectations. 
The concept of “citizen-consumer” implies a social practice – “voting with your money” 
– that can satisfy competing ideologies of consumerism (an idea rooted in individual self-
interest) and citizenship (an ideal rooted in collective responsibility to a social and ecological 
commons). An individual’s commodity choice can satisfy an his/her desire for personal health 
and happiness while generating sustainability and social agreement for society as a whole. 
This logic makes plausible the concept of the hybrid citizen consumer, able to satisfy personal 
desires while simultaneously addressing social and environmental issues (Johnston, 2008). 
Much of the literature in this area is based on the idea that consumer responsibility is an 
objectively  identifiable,  and  to  some  extent  measurable  quality  possessed  by  individuals 
(Caruana and Crane, 2008).  
￿
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A number of empirical studies have linked consumer behaviour as ‘voting behaviour’ to 
perceptions of consumer responsibility (Dickinson and Carsky, 2005 among others). Even 
when  consumers  are  potentially  willing  to  adopt  this  type  of  responsibility  and  seek  to 
influence firms, their ability to do so will depend upon the availability of relevant information 
(Barnett et al., 2005) relating to firms’ practices and policies and to the consequences of 
consumers’  choices.  However,  as  we  said,  information  alone  will  not  guarantee  that 
consumers respond; too much information can create a sense of ‘information overload’, which 
deters a response (Hahn et al., 1992). Consumer response also depends on his/her ability to 
understand the information. Consumers are often confused about environmental issues and are 




4. What drives consumer’s social responsibility?  
 
Consumer  behaviour  is  a  multidimensional  phenomenon.  Factors  thought  to  influence 
consumers’ sustainability-related behaviours, include their demographics, values, attitudes, 
goals, social identity, perceived self-efficacy, situational forces, and knowledge.  
Social preferences, for example, refer to the phenomena that people seem to care about 
certain “social” goals, such as the well-being of other individuals or a “fair” allocation among 
members  in  society
4,  in  addition  to  their  own  material  benefits.  Kahneman  and  Tversky 
(2000)  and  Sobel  (2005),  among  others,  present  accounts  of  both  real  life  examples  and 
experimental results. 
Many of the potential influences on consumer behaviour in relation to sustainability, are 
incorporated within conventional integrative models of consumer behaviour and have also 
been well researched in conventional, as well as sustainable consumption contexts. Grob’s 
(1995) Model of Environmental Behavior, for example, found that environmental knowledge 
together  with  personal  values,  perceived  control,  and  emotional  response  determined 
environmental behaviour.  
Although the satisfaction of personal preference is considered as an individualistic, self-
regarding exercise, individuals might develop a taste for certain collective goals as part of 
their  personal  repertoire  of  preferences.  This  could  be  a  result  of  altruism  or  pro-social 
behaviour or fashion. Following a fashion may be a goal that brings personal satisfaction. Its 
pursuit is therefore rational, and an individual pursuing a fashion for CSR will ignore the 
problems of collective action.  
A vast literature from behavioural economics highlights the impact of social pressure 
and social norms on environmental decision-making. Social norms and social pressure, in 
turn,  may be affected by values and attitudes. Social norms imply that (certain) people should 
manifest a prescribed behaviour or not manifest a proscribed behaviour. Such norms arise 
when individual actions cause negative side-effects for others (Coleman, 1990) and serve the 
function of restricting egoistic impulses in favour of collective outcomes. Social norms may, 
i.e., drive unselfish behaviour and conditional contributions to public goods.. 
Violation of social norms is punished by social sanctions. Social norms may become 
internalised, in which case sanctions (in the form of guilt feelings or pride) are administered 
                                                
3 Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2005, p. 4) argue, for example, that - although climate change is perceived as a severe 
risk to society - ‘individual action is contingent upon the degree of personal costs incurred, in part mediated 
through  those  institutions  and  actors  perceived  to  have  some  responsibility  in  delivering  a  solution  to  the 
problem, and trusted to do so’. 
4 Fairness, for example, is an argument in individual utility functions, (e.g. see Fehr and Schmidt,  1999) on 
inequity aversion. Concerns about fairness may affect decision-making in relation to environmental issues and 
future generation’s opportunities.  
￿
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by the individual him/herself. Guilt feelings are discomforting and may lead individual to 
modify his/her behaviour. 
If their desired consumption behaviour was perceived to cause negative environmental 
externalities,consumers might experience cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). As evidence 
of  negative  environmental  consequences  emanating  from  increasing  consumption 
accumulates, cognitive dissonance should increase. It may be discomforting, infact, to buy 
products from, or invest in, or work for firms or countries of origin that have acquired a 
reputation for producing negative externalities
5.  
Cognitive dissonane must be resolved to preserve consumer’s self-image. Individuals do 
not  like  to  see  themselves  as  careless  consumers  whose  consumptions  is  damaging 
environment. The cognitive dissonance can be reconcilied if they change their view of the 
value of consumption or change their view about the consequences of their behaviour. 
Environmental knowledge together with personal values and social norms determine 
environmental behaviour. 
 
5. Consumer responsibility as a complement of CSR 
 
Consumers are an important and complex factor in the CSR equation: undoubtedly,  they may 
contribute  to  its  diffusion  trough  their  purchase  behaviour.  Firms  need  to  become  more 
proactive  with  respect  to  consumer  social  responsibility  if  they  want  to  make  their  CSR 
initiatives more effective.  
Williams  (2005)  assigns,  infact,  an  important  role  to  the  consumer’s  social 
responsibility, the role of complement of CSR. He suggests the development of a proactive 
notion of consumer social responsibility that encourages more socially and environmentally 
favourable behaviour by firms. The link between consumer power and responsibility is also 
highlighted by Peters (2005): consumers can affect, and therefore bear some responsibility 
for, the practices and policies of firms.  
Lack of awareness about CSR initiatives is a limiting factor in consumers’ ability to 
reward/punish corporations appropriately (Bhattacharya and Sen 2004). 
Businesses  are,  therefore,  recommend  to  target  responsible  consumers  with  relevant 
information  about  the  social  responsibility  credentials  of  their  products  and  services  (via 
labelling or advertising media) and consumers, in turn, will properly process this information 
in their formulation of product choices. 
A  number  of  environmental  policy  initiatives  increase  awarness  and  concern  for 
environmetal problems. This depend on the belief that, with increasing concern, consumption 
behaviours would become more envoronmental responsible, and consumers would change 
their purchase patterns by buying green products or by reducing their level of consumption.  
The goal of any market exchange is the satisfaction of the desires expressed by the 
participants in that exchange. If consumer’s satisfaction can be identified with happiness, then 
optimizing  the  satisfaction  of  consumer’s  preferences  equals  to  optimize  happiness. 
Individually, this claim would be that the more someone consumes, of anything, the happier 
he or she is. This is, obviously, not always true. If firms redesigned themselves on a model of 
sustainability, significant harm could be prevented, at present and into the near future. 
A  number  of  businesses  make  a  considerable  effort  to  learn  about  their  customers’ 
preferences and opinions, so they can create products and services that people will want to 
buy. Consumer’s opinion about the environmental performance of a firm and its products, or 
labour  conditions  in  firms,  can  be  translated  into  business  action  for  sustainability  by 
                                                
5 A taste for CSR might exist in labour markets too: people might prefer to work for firms with good reputations.  
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consumers taking these issues into account when they buy, invest, or provide feedback to 
businesses.  
The market enables those operating within it to express their preferences. According to 
neoclassical economists preferences are exogenous and unchanging through time, yet they 
have  to  be  deeply  investigated.  In  Galbraith’s schema  preferences  are  determined  by  the 
corporate techno-structures (Gintis, 1972).  Firms, engaging actively and routinely in shaping 
consumer tastes, generate fashions.  
Individuals, as we said, are often confused about environmental issues. On the one hand, 
they should be motivated to consume in a way more sustainable; on the other hand they 
should motivate firms to adopt more sustainable processes and produce environment-friendly 
commodities. 
Where the difference in the costs that the consumer incurs from pursuing environmental 
friendly  rather  than  unfriendly  behaviour  is  very  small,  but  the  implications  of  the 
environmental damage are extremely large, it may still be rational to accept the costs of being 
an  environmentally  regarding  consumer,  even  after  the  environmental  damage  risk  is 
discounted over time (Crouch, 2006).  
In what circumstances firms will actively promote market niches that associate them 
with negative externality reduction?  
Firms, as we have seen, may seek to take pre-emptive action to avoid social conflict and 
strict regulation. To do this requires having an organizational capacity to intervene against 
short-term market advantage and short-term shareholder interests, but the response is always 
triggered by either political or market challenge.  
Investors care for CSR indirectly; they consider CSR an indicator of a firm’s probity.  
Consumers and investors - in their market exchanges with firms - may also have long-term 
interests that lead them to reward the firms that adopt CSR practices. 
By being watchful to current and future social and environmental issues, firms will be 
able to anticipate changes and disturbances.  They may have, in turn, a long term interest in 
performing well on CSR in order to convince current investors and consumers that they are 
honest and actual and potential investors that they are profitable. If so, there will be market 
niches for firms able to supply products environmental friendly and there will be good profits 
to be made from being the first to discover them. 
Investors may be sensitive to a taste for CSR for other reasons: they have to believe that 
such taste exists, or will soon exist, among consumers, and they will start to prefer investing 
in companies with CSR reputations (Crouch, 2006). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The degradation of the natural environment is one of the main threats to human survival in the 
long term. Producers and consumers are to a great extent responsible for this degradation and 
must accept compromises in order to achieve what has been called ‘sustainable development’. 
The relationship between firms and environment is complex. Environmental law cannot, 
and should not, prescribe every decision taken by every business. Instead, consideration of 
environmental  issues,  the  direct  and  indirect  environmental  impacts  of  business,  the 
environmental issues of concern to the wider community, and the risks and opportunities 
associated with them, should be part of good business practice. 
Environmental considerations are frequently viewed as barriers to profitability. They are 
viewed as costs to be minimized or regulations with which to comply. The environment is 
rarely considered central to business strategy unless there is some regulation that constrains 
business goals.   
￿
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For firms seeking, however, to develop more sustainable systems of consumption and 
production,  the  role  that  consumers’  sense  of  responsibility  plays  in  their  willingness  to 
engage in  pro-environmental behaviour is  relevant. These firms  have  interest in  motivate 
sustainability oriented consumption behaviours. 
The unresolved paradox concerning the role of CSR in consumer’s behaviour is that 
consumer  give  more  and  more  responsibilities  to  firms, expect an  environmental-friendly 
behaviour from them but do not give an appropriate weight to the CSR initiatives in their 
purchase behaviour. 
Probably, consumers perceive their own opportunities to influence the product-oriented 
market as small. To favour unusual environment friendly consumption habits such as, for 
example, the habit of travelling by bus, is a key challenge in incorporating such behaviours 
within consumer’ perceptions of their own sphere of influence and responsibility. Further 
research on the topic of responsibility in terms of consumer responsiveness to environmental 
issues when they hold others more responsible than themselves – an issue neglected in the 
literature, is desirable. 
The perception of a shared responsibility for dealing, for example, with climate change 
amongst consumers could create opportunities for companies and governments to develop 
strategies and partnerships that build on this and could perhaps benefit from complementary 
relationships about their varying responsibilities and resources for tackling climate change. 
Environmental pro-activity is typical of companies that voluntarily take measures to 
reduce their impact on the natural environment. The idea behind this paper is that, in addition 
to a company which evolves and carries out its activities beyond what is required by law, 
something as consumer responsibility is needed. 
This short paper only proposes a general framework. A number of questions remain 
unanswered, especially around the extent to which the discussed responsibilities remain open 
to individual interpretation. Furthermore, it is of course simplistic to do not take into account 
local  government,  education  sector  and  non-governmental  organizations.  They  play 
significant  roles in  establishing  norms  of  behaviour  and  practices  having  the  potential  to 
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